

## EFFORTS TO BUILD A EUROPEAN ARMY IN THE PRE-BREXIT PERIOD AS PART OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

### AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN ORTAK GÜVENLİK VE SAVUNMA POLİTİKASI KAPSAMINDA BREXIT ÖNCESİ DÖNEMDE AVRUPA ORDUSU KURMA ÇABALARI

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**Abstract:** *The European Union has taken many concrete steps in its common defence policy due to the environment created by the changed security perception, especially after the end of the Cold War. Some of these concrete steps relate to military power, which is an essential component of security. The structure of the armed forces necessary for the implementation of an effective common security and defence policy has led to various debates within the Union. The aim of this article is to examine whether it is possible for the European Union to build a European army within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy by incorporating the perspectives of France, Germany and other EU Members. In this article, Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmental approach has been used as a theoretical framework, and the period from the founding of the European Union to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from membership has been discussed.*

**Keywords:** *European Union, Common Security and Defence Policy, European Army, Liberal Intergovernmentalism.*

**Öz:** *Avrupa Birliği, özellikle Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden sonra değişen güvenlik algısının yarattığı ortam nedeniyle ortak savunma politikasında birçok somut adım attı. Bu somut adımlardan bazıları güvenliğin temel bir bileşeni olan askeri güçle ilgilidir. Etkili bir ortak güvenlik ve savunma politikasının uygulanması için gerekli olan silahlı kuvvetlerin yapısı Birlik içinde çeşitli tartışmalara yol açmıştır. Bu makalenin amacı, Avrupa Birliği'nin Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası çerçevesinde Fransa, Almanya ve diğer birlik üyelerinin bakış açılarını da dahil ederek bir Avrupa ordusu kurmasının mümkün olup olmadığını incelemektir. Bu makalede Andrew Moravcsik'in liberal hükümetler arası yaklaşımı teorik bir çerçeve olarak kullanılmış ve Avrupa Birliği'nin kuruluşundan Brexit'e kadar olan dönem ele alınmıştır.*

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Avrupa Birliği, Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası, Avrupa ordusu, Liberal hükümetlerarasıcılık.*

## INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The classical intergovernmental approach is an influential approach among regional integration theories that has been developed since the mid-1960s as an alternative to the new functionalist approach. However, the liberal intergovernmental approach is one of the approaches that best explains regional integration. In fact, the liberal intergovernmental approach can be defined as an approach that builds on both liberal and institutionalist theories of international relations (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2019: 64).

While Andrew Moravcsik developed the liberal intergovernmental approach, he worked on the new functionalist approach and identified the shortcomings of this approach. He explained that the first shortcoming of the new functionalist approach was that it could not predict the functioning of the process that the European Community (EC) would follow. The concept of diffusion advocated by the new functionalist approach was not automatic; intergovernmental negotiations were at the forefront and no agreement could be reached in the political field. He also agreed with the new functionalist approach's emphasis on developments in the economic sphere and even incorporated the concept of economic profit into the liberal intergovernmental approach. In addition to the concept of economic profit, he also incorporated the idea of political economy and interdependence into his approach and described the EC as a regime. In this context, it can be said that the liberal intergovernmental approach has influences from the classical intergovernmental approach and neorealist theory (Öraz, 2011: 1612).

The liberal intergovernmental approach has much in common with the classic intergovernmental approach. On the other hand, a few additions must be made due to some of the shortcomings of the intergovernmental approach. Firstly, in classical intergovernmentalism, nation states are the only actors in international politics; in liberal intergovernmentalism, however, individuals and interest groups are also important alongside nation states. Furthermore, classical intergovernmentalism argues that there can be no co-operation on primarily political issues. The liberal intergovernmental approach, on the other hand, takes a more positive view of reaching agreement on primary political issues. Finally, in classical intergovernmentalism, the interests of the nation state can be defended in the context of its position and effectiveness in the international system; since in liberal intergovernmentalism domestic political dynamics influence foreign policy, factors such as voter preferences, national interest groups and political power struggles, which constitute the dynamics of domestic politics, can be said to have a say in determining state interests (Akgül, 2004: 18).

While the liberal intergovernmental approach has similarities with the intergovernmental approach, there is also a relationship between them and neorealist theory. The liberal intergovernmental approach converges with neorealist theory at the point where neorealist theory differs from realist theory. Neorealists, who do not think as strictly about co-operation between nation states as traditional realists, unite in this context with those who advocate the liberal intergovernmental approach. This is because, according to both liberal intergovernmentalists and neorealists, nation states can co-operate in an international anarchic structure through similar policies, even if they have different systems and ideologies (Öraz, 2011: 1613).

Another important concept in the liberal intergovernmental approach, according to Moravcsik, is rationality. For this reason, European integration is best explained as a series of rational decisions made by national politicians. These rational decisions are guided by the economic interests of powerful interest groups within the nation state, the relative power of each nation state and the reliability of commitments made by international institutions to nation states (Moravcsik 1998: 18). In addition to rationality, there are two other fundamental elements at the core of the liberal intergovernmental approach. These elements are the formation of a liberal theory of national choice and the intergovernmental analysis of interstate bargaining (Moravcsik, 1993: 480). The liberal intergovernmental approach is still valid today. In fact, in his 2018 article entitled "Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21st Century Europe", Moravcsik noted that very few scholars object to the ability of the liberal intergovernmental approach to explain the past (Moravcsik, 2018: 1658).

Gary Marks' multi-level governance approach is another approach that can be used to explain European integration. In the 1990s, it became difficult to separate the concepts of domestic and foreign policy. The multi-level governance approach fundamentally criticises the fact that the nation state alone has decision-making powers. According to this approach, decisions should be made at supranational, national and subnational levels and elements such as the market, civil society and local people should be involved in the process (Dede, 2012: 245). This approach, which assumes that the influence of nation states will decrease as the number of actors within the Union increases, focuses on the role of European institutions in enlargement and the influence of new member states on governance. In the multi-level governance approach, the heterogeneity that occurs within the Union with enlargement following the membership of new countries was seen as a problem. He stated that the nature of decisions taken within the Union will be flexible due to the different policy preferences of different member countries (Aytuğ, 2008: 155-156).

Looking separately at the structures of the EU institutions and the policies they implement, it becomes clear that different approaches can be used to explain different institutions and policies. For example, the structure of institutions such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Central Bank can be explained by a supranational approach or a functionalist approach that is close to federalism. However, the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) cannot be fully explained by these approaches. Therefore, Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmental approach was used in this study as a theoretical framework that can be used to explain the CSDP.

## 1. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH QUESTION

In this study, while conducting a literature review as a methodology, the "historical research method" was used while discussing the history of the EU CSDP; by using the "secondary data analysis" method, various articles, books, treaties and sources on the official websites of the Council of Europe and the EU External Relations Service were used. The question "Can the European Union build a European army within the framework of the CSDP?" is the main topic of this research. Within the Union, there are those who are in favour of the idea of a European army, those who are firmly against it and those who are undecided. The

favourable attitude of France and Germany towards this idea increased the seriousness of the debate within the Union. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom, another dominant power that was strongly opposed to the idea of a European army, contributed to the determination of some member states to create a European army.

## **2. HISTORICAL PROCESS OF THE EU'S CSDP**

### **2.1. Treaty of Dunkirk**

The Treaty of Dunkirk of 1947 between England and France can be cited as the basis of the security formations in Europe (Özdal, 2013: 59). The main purpose of this first concrete step at the end of the Second World War was to prevent possible German aggression and a Soviet threat.

The signing of the Brussels Treaty, which will ensure the formation of the Western Union, just one year after the signing of the aforementioned treaty, is a sign that European countries are making efforts to improve defence and security issues.

### **2.2. Emergence of the Western European Union**

As a result of changing security perceptions after the Second World War, European allies began to make efforts to improve their relations. Although the American presence provided security, the possibility of German re-empowerment and the potential Soviet threat led to the search for many alternative solutions to create a secure Europe (Rohan, 2014: 13). The Western European Union (WEU), which emerged as a result of this research, occupies an important place in the history of the EU's CSDP.

The origins of the WEU lie in the Western Union (Brussels Treaty Organisation), which was established in 1948 by the Treaty of Brussels between the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Luxembourg. The Western Union, which consisted of five countries, was given the name WEU in 1954, with West Germany and Italy participating (Tezcan, 1999: 144).

The WEU is an important structure with regard to the goal of initiating a common European movement in the areas of security and defence. In addition, with the establishment of the WEU, the article (Article 4, Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation and on Collective Self-Defence. Brussels Treaty, Western European Union) came into force, which states that other WEU member states will act together to protect any WEU member state exposed to an armed attack historical steps in the framework of security and defence policy (Türker, 2007: 52).

### **2.3. Pleven Plan and the Initiative to Create a European Defence Community**

In 1950, the Pleven Plan was presented by René Pleven with the assistance of Jean Monnet. Within the framework of the plan, the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) was signed in 1952. The treaty did not enter into force

after it was not approved by the French parliament, and the attempt to establish the EDC failed.

The Pleven Plan aimed to establish the EDC in a supranational structure. The plan envisaged the establishment of 6 divisions, one of which would belong to Germany and consist of 10,000 soldiers each; to ensure the coordination of the army consisting of different nationalities, the establishment of a joint general staff and the appointment of a European Minister of Defence were considered (Caşın et al., 2020: 249). The plan in question focused in detail on the concept of a common army and formed the basic thought infrastructure of the Treaty establishing the EDC.

The Treaty establishing the EDC, signed in 1952, contains a political declaration of intent to create a military structure that is as integrated as possible. In addition to this declaration, it was stated that the feeling of patriotism would be extended beyond the national dimension in order to harmonise with the community spirit (Gözkaman, 2014: 8). These statements, which seem quite optimistic in theory, were not realised in practice. As stated in the paragraph above, the EDC, which was founded on the French politician Pleven and attempted to be established at the suggestion of France, could not be established due to the veto of the French parliament. Efforts to build a European army were therefore postponed; Europe acted with the assurance of NATO in security and defence matters. With Germany's accession to NATO in 1955, the Elysee Treaty was signed between France and Germany on 22 January 1963.

#### **2.4. Formation and development process of European Political Cooperation**

After Germany joined NATO in 1955, the Élysée Treaty was signed between France and Germany on 22 January 1963. This agreement formed the basis for the Treaty of Aachen, which was signed between the two countries 56 years later on the same day and in which both countries called for a European army. Today, the Élysée Treaty is seen as the basis for the close friendship between Germany and France. An astonishing development, as Germany and France had been locked in terrible wars and hostilities for a century. The relationship between the two countries was labelled hereditary enmity. The First World War and the Treaty of Versailles, the Second World War and the subsequent period of occupation, the lost provinces, such as Alsace and the Moselle region, were the two countries (Federal Government, 2023).

The Fouchet plans drawn up by Christian Fouchet, which supported Charles de Gaulle's idea of a European confederation, were presented in 1961-62 but were not adopted. Following the failure of the Fouchet plans, the Luxembourg Report was published in the early 1970s, which can be seen as the first concrete step in the area of security and defence. European Political Co-operation (EPC) was founded in 1970 with the Luxembourg Report, also known as the Davignon Report because it was drawn up by the Belgian Etienne Davignon. The Copenhagen Report was published in 1973 and it was decided that the member states would consult each other before making their final decisions on all major foreign policy issues. The London Report, published in 1981, improved the EPC's administrative structure and political decision-making mechanisms. This report addressed the political dimension of security and reaffirmed the commitment of member states to consult each other (Caşın et al., 2020: 268-273).

Not long after the London Report, the Genscher-Colombo Plan was presented in the same year by the then German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the Italian Foreign Minister Emiliano Colombo. However, this plan, which envisaged increased political co-operation between the member states, the development of a common European foreign policy and new regulations on security issues, was not adopted (Özdal and Genç 2004: 99-100). Although the Gencher-Colombo Plan was not accepted, it paved the way for the Single European Act (SEA); it paved the way for the process of defining the scope and role of EPC (Efe 2010: 52-53). This initiative led to the publication of the Stuttgart Declaration in 1983. This declaration stated that the EPC should be strengthened and that the member states should adopt a common stance on the economic and political dimensions of security in addition to foreign policy (Özdal, 2013: 98-99).

## **2.5. Maastricht Treaty**

In August 1990, Iraq began the invasion of Kuwait; Yugoslavia began to disintegrate when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June 1991 and Macedonia declared its independence in September 1991; with the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev, the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), in December 1991, the USSR entered the process of disintegration. In all these events, Europe failed to show a common vision and adopt a common stance. During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, for example, the United Kingdom placed more than 40,000 soldiers under the command of the USA. Although France provided support with 18,000 soldiers, it insisted on a diplomatic solution in order not to damage its relations with the oil producers and not to lose its influence on the arms market (Tangör 2010). Germany did not provide any support and Belgium stopped selling ammunition to England because it feared possible retaliation. Portugal and Spain allowed their navies to be used only to conduct the Iraq blockade and demining, and Ireland remained neutral throughout the process (The Portugal Times, 2018).

It was thus understood how important it is for the EU, which has become politically ineffective, to reach a consensus on security and defence issues. Despite being an economically strong Union, it was recognised that it was not sufficient in terms of presenting a common political and military stance. In this context, the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992. With the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force one year after it was signed, the EU was given its current name and the CSDP was defined as one of the three pillars of the EU (Tangör, 2010: 36). The CSDP mechanism contained in the Maastricht Treaty is intended to ensure that the EU has a say in the international system in the areas of security and foreign policy. Furthermore, the WEU is to be part of NATO in Europe within the framework of the defence dimension of security.

## **2.6. Petersberg Missions**

The WEU, which under the Maastricht Treaty is responsible for the functioning of the EU's decisions and actions in the area of defence, published a declaration shortly after the agreement together with the meeting of its members in the same

year. With this declaration, it was decided that the tasks of humanitarian aid and rescue, peacekeeping, crisis management and peace restoration, so-called Petersberg missions, would be carried out by the WEU (Tangör 2010: 36-37). At this meeting, the operational tasks of the WEU were clearly defined and the aim was to take on a more active role. It was determined that in the event of a conflict between the WEU and NATO, the commitments in the areas of security and defence would become invalid (Kızıltan and Kaya, 2005: 212). In addition to the obligations set out in the Petersberg Declaration, relations between WEU member states, other EU countries and NATO member states are defined. The importance of transatlantic relations was emphasised. Otherwise, the Combined Allied Task Force (CATF) was established to utilise NATO facilities and capabilities for the operations to be conducted by the WEU. It is planned to benefit from CATF in the operations conducted in the framework of the Petersberg missions. In cases where the deployment of the UN Secretary-General is considered, it was assumed that the EU could not operate independently of NATO (Gençalp, 2004: 49). In the following years, it became apparent that the activities carried out by WEU within the framework of the Petersberg missions were not implemented at the desired level and the activities carried out were limited to the exercise level (Pagani, 1998: 738).

## **2.7. Treaty of Amsterdam**

The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 and entered into force two years later, in 1999. A comparison of the CSDP objectives in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Maastricht reveals that very similar terms are used. Looking at the additions to the Treaty of Amsterdam in the context of the objectives, it is noticeable that the external borders are also included in the protection of peace and the strengthening of international security. On the other hand, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a number of innovations. It established the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and planned the creation of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit to monitor and assess international trends and take timely action. The concept of a common strategy against possible crises was mentioned and the common strategy of the Council of Europe was established (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997: 9-10). The aim was to define a common strategy, attitude and common action. The Petersberg tasks were included in the scope of the CSDP and a constructive abstention was implemented, paving the way for qualified majority voting. The Treaty of Amsterdam brought the Union a step closer to implementing a common policy on defence and security.

## **2.8. The Berlin Plus Agreement**

The Berlin Plus Agreement was signed in 2002 to define the relationship between the EU and NATO and to ensure that the EU benefits from NATO's capabilities in the operations it conducts. This co-operation established EU access to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in October 2005 to enable more effective use of NATO's capabilities. The agreement defines under which conditions and in which way the EU will benefit from NATO's capabilities through a separate NATO-EU agreement. Another possibility is the realisation of a security agreement on intelligence sharing between the EU and NATO. Another

objective was military co-operation between the EU and NATO to build capabilities (Akgül, Açıkmeşe and Dizdaroğlu, 2014: 153-156).

With the entry into force of the Berlin Plus Regulation, the EU began to benefit from NATO's capabilities and capacities. The first EU operation using NATO facilities and capabilities was the Operation Concordia, which was carried out in North Macedonia between 31 March and 15 December 2003. Following Operation Concordia, the Operation EUFOR Althea was launched in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 2 December 2004. The EU therefore began its operations in coordination with NATO, utilising NATO's capabilities and capacities and increasing the number of operations it conducted from day to day.

## **2.9. European Security Strategy**

The political elites of European countries regard the EU as a globally influential power, politically on a par with the USA. However, the EU has a different political stance to the USA. This difference in attitude and the fact that the USA did not attach sufficient importance to the EU's positions in transatlantic relations led to the EU wanting to develop a political stance that could represent an alternative to the USA. As part of this political stance to be developed, the document of the European Security Strategy drawn up by the then EU Secretary-General and High Representative Javier Solana was adopted on 12 December 2003. It became clear after this document that the EU wanted to be politically effective.

One of the biggest factors in the acceptance of this document was the differences of opinion that erupted at the time over the Iraq crisis. Due to the different perceptions of world politics by the US and the EU, the attitudes and actions of the US towards Iraq showed that the threat concept between the two sides was not the same (Büyükbaş, 2006: 48-50). For example, at the time when the Saddam regime was perceived as a threat by the international public, the US declared that it could use military force to destroy weapons of mass destruction if necessary, while the EU proposed sending United Nations (UN) weapons inspectors to Iraq. In the event that Saddam did not want UN weapons inspectors in Iraq, no EU country, except the UK, accepted the option of military force. The US claimed that Saddam and the weapons in Iraq threatened their national security, but the EU argued that the weapons could be brought under control. Again, the EU emphasised that the use of military force against Iraq should be done with a request from the UN Security Council, but the US did not consider the UN Security Council request necessary under the principle of self-defence (Kahraman, 2003: 152-153). The document emphasises that no country can deal with today's complex problems on its own (European Security Strategy 2003). This emphasis is important for the adoption of the concept of partnership in foreign policy. Although this document does not provide full CSDP integrity, it can be seen as an important step in security and defence issues.

## **2.10. European Defence Agency**

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established on 12 July 2004 as a result of the EU's efforts to create an agency focused on the military capabilities of



member states. The US was initially sceptical about this agency in terms of its efforts to transform the EU's armed forces and its ability to deal with what it perceived as global security threats. In parallel, they asked the EU when the newly established EDA would take its place as a real instrument in global politics. Although the EDA had a modest beginning, it has shown in this context that it has the potential to make a significant difference (Schwarzer, 2007).

Looking at the EDA in terms of the tasks assigned to it, it is clear that its mission is very broad. In terms of the purpose of establishing the EDA, the following are: to improve the EU's defence capabilities, to conduct research in the field of defence, to cooperate member states and strengthen cooperation in armaments, to bring the European market into a more competitive position and to increase Europe's technological development for defence and progress in industry objective, to increase the R&D rate in the European defence industry and to identify military needs at both union and national level (Önek and Işık, 2012: 305).

However, these initiatives also come with many caveats that call into question the effectiveness of the EDA. In addition to the theoretical framework, when viewed from a concrete perspective, it can be seen that the policies implemented by each member state at the national level, their national security concerns and areas of interest are different. Otherwise, each country wants to protect its national defence industry for military and strategic reasons. Also, member states often find it difficult to raise the economic budget required to implement an effective defence industrial policy (Hartley, 2008: 304-307).

As a result, many steps were taken in the defence sector with the EDA and a significant development was achieved. The EDA thus became one of the important turning points in the CSDP framework. Although the intergovernmental attitude of the member states prevents the EDA from achieving a better position, the effectiveness of its current position should not be underestimated.

## **2.11. Treaty of Lisbon**

The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007. It entered into force on 1 January 2009 after being approved on the basis of the procedures in the national laws of the member states. The Lisbon Treaty, also known as the amended version of the EU Constitution, which was rejected by France and the Netherlands on the grounds that it contained federalist language, took many steps in the areas of security and defence. On this basis, the European Security and Defence Policy was changed to CSDP, the unit of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was established and it was emphasised that the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy would be supported by the EU. The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU were given legal personality and thus became a legal entity. The way was paved for participation in international meetings as a legal entity, the extended list of Petersberg tasks was included in the founding treaty of the EU, implemented for the first time and a permanent structural cooperation practice was introduced (Özdal, 2013: 181-196).

Despite these steps taken within the framework of the CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty, discussions between the member states continued. These discussions

basically took place within the framework of two perspectives. The first group, which dealt with issues of common security and defence after the treaty in the context of rationalist theories, argued that these issues would remain at the national level despite any arrangements and that a common defence policy could not be established, but relations with NATO could continue (Zhussipbek 2009). Neutral countries at the time, such as Sweden, Finland and Austria, who were among those who held this view, defined the EU's security and defence policy only within the framework of the Petersberg tasks; Britain, on the other hand, advocated the continuation of the intergovernmental structure (Kocamaz, 2010: 952-953).

The second view, which contrasts with the rationalist view, argues that the EU has made many developments in security and defence matters over the last fifty years and has become increasingly supranational. According to those who hold this view, joint operations are carried out in many different parts of the world, despite their shortcomings, which contribute to integration (2010).

## **2.12. Permanent Structured Cooperation**

The concept of permanent structured cooperation, which was put forward years ago with the Treaty of Lisbon, was brought back to light by the efforts of Germany and France. Due to the general sense of insecurity among member states and the increasing desire for integration in European security, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched on 11 December 2017 with the participation of 25 EU member states (Billion-Galland and Quencez, 2017: 1). The United Kingdom, Denmark and Malta have decided not to join PESCO (Inat, 2018).

At this time, instability arose in the atmosphere of uncertainty that prevailed in the world after the Arab Spring, and as a result of this instability, the refugee crisis erupted, terrorist attacks occurred in the EU and Russia began to follow a more aggressive stance in foreign policy. After the Brexit referendum on 23 December 2016, it became clear that the UK, known for its Atlanticist stance and opposed to any supranational structures being created, would be leaving the EU. The EU's defence efforts accelerated after Donald Trump, the 45th President of the United States, who took office in 2017, declared that the EU's NATO spending was insufficient and more support was needed for intervention in the event of a possible attack (Turhan, 2019: 358-359). The political conjuncture of the time, the member states' views on security and defence policy and their proximity to intergovernmental/supranational principles contributed effectively to the structural design of PESCO.

## **3. PERSPECTIVES OF THE TWO DOMINANT COUNTRIES (GERMANY AND FRANCE) ON THE CSDP AND THE CONCEPT OF THE EUROPEAN ARMY**

The political measures implemented in the EU with regard to European security are essentially organised within the framework of France's Europeanist approach and the United Kingdom's Atlanticist approach. Germany, one of the leading countries in the EU, has shown an attitude close to France's Europeanist discourse. As EU foreign

policy is shaped under the influence of Germany and France, this section examines the common security and defence policy of the two countries under consideration and their perspectives on the concept of the European army separately; the approaches of other EU members are examined under a different heading, with countries with similar views belonging to the same group.

### **3.1. Germany's Perspective on the CSDP and the European Army Concept**

Germany is one of the most influential countries in the EU, both politically and economically. The fact that it emerged from a completely devastated state after the Second World War to its current state is a great example of success. The reality that Germany, under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, adopted the principle of full Western integration in its foreign policy after the war formed the basis for this example of success. During the complete integration process, Germany positioned itself as a civilian power within the system and was the driving force of the Union on many issues. The change in the bipolar world order after the Cold War and the reunification of Germany led to a reorganisation of German foreign policy (Kıratlı, 2016: 213-214).

After German reunification, three different approaches to shaping German foreign policy were proposed. The first of these approaches is to save on defence spending by being under the US security umbrella as in the Cold War era; the second is to strive to become one of the rule-setting countries on the international stage, taking into account the high cost of defence; and the last involves taking an active role in the development of CSDP by taking a leading position within the EU, sharing responsibilities and costs with other EU members and ensuring that while protecting EU interests, national interests are taken into account (Şirin, 2020: 475-476).

Of these three approaches, it can be said that Germany has opted to shape its foreign policy using the third approach. Indeed, the document drafted by the Federal Government in 2016 entitled "White Paper" on the future of German security policy and armed forces states that Germany has become an increasingly important player in the future of Europe and is prepared to assume responsibility and leadership in this context (Bundesregierung, 2016: 22). Furthermore, opinion polls revealed that Germany needs to build strategic relationships with EU members, particularly France, rather than with the USA. These topics are supported by the opinion survey "The Berlin Pulse 2020/21" conducted by the German Körber Foundation, which is active in the field of foreign policy. For example, addressed to German citizens in 2020,

- "Which country is Germany's most important partner?" The answer to the question was: 42% France and 23% USA. When this question was posed during the Trump era in the same year, the figures were given as 53% for France and 10% for the USA.

- "How do you see the current relationship between Germany and the USA?" The answer to the question was "I have a bad view", with a rate of 80 %.

- "Do you see the USA as a partner in ensuring European security?" The question was answered by 40 % with "I do not see it as a partner",

- "Should Germany intervene more in international crises?" In response to this question, 44% said that Germany should be more involved in international crises (Körber Foundation, 2020: 33-37).

German citizens' support for the EU's CSDP and Common Foreign Policy has remained above the EU average over the years. This can be clearly seen in the Eurobarometers. The results of the public opinion surveys on the CSDP and the Common Foreign Policy in the last fifteen Eurobarometers are shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.

**Table 1: Opinion of German Citizens in Relation to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy**

	Supported	Not supported	Don't know
Eurobarometer 93 (Summer 20)	82%	11%	6%
Eurobarometer 92 (Autumn 19)	85%	11%	4%
Eurobarometer 91 (Spring 19)	85%	11%	4%
Eurobarometer 90 (Autumn 18)	87%	10%	3%
Eurobarometer 89 (Spring 18)	86%	12%	2%
Eurobarometer 88 (Autumn 17)	85%	12%	3%
Eurobarometer 87 (Spring 17)	85%	12%	3%
Eurobarometer 86 (Autumn 16)	85%	12%	3%
Eurobarometer 85 (Spring 16)	82%	14%	4%
Eurobarometer 84 (Autumn 15)	79%	17%	4%
Eurobarometer 83 (Spring 15)	81%	14%	5%
Eurobarometer 82 (Autumn 14)	83%	12%	5%
Eurobarometer 81 (Spring 14)	78%	16%	6%
Eurobarometer 80 (Autumn 13)	82%	14%	4%
Eurobarometer 79 (Spring 13)	79%	16%	5%

Source: Eurobarometer 79-93, 2013-2020.

**Table 1.2: Opinion of German Citizens on the EU's Common Foreign Policy**

	Supported	Not supported	Don't know
Eurobarometer 93 (Summer 20)	82%	12%	6%
Eurobarometer 92 (Autumn 19)	82%	12%	6%
Eurobarometer 91 (Spring 19)	82%	13%	5%
Eurobarometer 90 (Autumn 18)	83%	13%	4%
Eurobarometer 89 (Spring 18)	85%	12%	3%
Eurobarometer 88 (Autumn 17)	80%	15%	5%

Eurobarometer 87 (Spring 17)	81%	15%	4%
Eurobarometer 86 (Autumn 16)	82%	14%	4%
Eurobarometer 85 (Spring 16)	77%	17%	6%
Eurobarometer 84 (Autumn 15)	77%	18%	5%
Eurobarometer 83 (Spring 15)	78%	16%	6%
Eurobarometer 82 (Autumn 14)	76%	16%	8%
Eurobarometer 81 (Spring 14)	73%	20%	7%
Eurobarometer 80 (Autumn 13)	75%	19%	6%
Eurobarometer 79 (Spring 13)	75%	19%	6%

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**Source:** Eurobarometer 79-93,2013-2020.

From the 2000s onwards, Germany, with the self-confidence of its strong economic structure, rethought its position within the EU and positioned itself as one of the leading states in the West. Over time, it became clear that Germany was not only an economic power, but also had political weight. In this context, at the 50th Munich Security Conference in 2014, it was expressed at the level of the Federal Presidency, the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence that Germany should take on more responsibility and that it was essential to participate politically and militarily at the international level (Bahadır, 2018: 176).

The concept of a European army, already expressed by French President Emmanuel Macron, was emphasised by the then German Chancellor Angela Merkel during the debate on the "Future of Europe" in the European Parliament on 13 November 2018. In her speech to the European Parliament, she said that the time for trusting others was over, referring to the USA. Merkel stated that Europeans should take their destiny into their own hands and emphasised the need to work on the vision of one day building a true European army (Lough, 2018).

At the signing ceremony of the Aachen Agreement between Germany and France on 22 January 2019, Merkel declared that Germany and France should create a common military culture and stated that a common defence and arms sales policy must be developed in order to lay the foundations of the European army (Ayhan, 2020: 519).

### **3.2. France's Perspective on the CSDP and the European Army Concept**

France has had a say in European politics throughout history and is one of the most influential countries in the EU. There are many reasons why it is an active country within the Union. France is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and, like other permanent members, has nuclear power. Due to its former colonial policy, it maintains political, cultural and economic relations with many countries around the world, particularly in Africa. Geographically, it is located in a central position in Europe. The proportion of educated personnel from France is higher than in other countries, and its cultural influence on Europe and the world continues.

Although France has these advantages and occupies a strong national position within the EU, its influence in world politics has declined compared to the past due to the economic and political difficulties it faced after the Second World War. When Charles de Gaulle realised this, he began to implement various measures to make France the centre of Europe. De Gaulle, who argued that the first prerequisite for France to become the central power in Europe was to reduce the influence of the USA in Europe, aimed to fill the power vacuum that would arise after the USA with France. In order to achieve this goal, British applications for membership of the European Community, known in France for its Atlanticist stance, were rejected twice, in 1963 and 1967; in 1966, French troops were not accepted under US command and left the military wing of NATO in the same year. Relations between France and NATO, which had stagnated during the Cold War, began to improve with the operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in 1992. In 2009, France returned to the military wing of NATO.

Alongside Germany, France was one of the most prominent countries in the European integration process, but although it was known as a European, it maintained its intergovernmental approach to security and defence policy in the early years. It attached great importance to protecting the veto rights of member states, particularly in matters of foreign policy. In the 2000s, changes in France's intergovernmental approach began to emerge and many reform proposals for the supranational structure of the CSDP were favourably received. For example, the establishment of the EU High Representative for Common Security and Foreign Policy, the operation of the enhanced co-operation structure within the CSDP and the establishment of an EU headquarters in Tervuren, Belgium, independent of NATO, were supported (Kıratlı, 2016: 216-218).

French citizens' support for the CSDP and the EU's Common Foreign Policy is shown in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. As can be seen from these tables, based on the last fifteen Eurobarometers, French citizens are not satisfied with the foreign policy implemented by the EU, but support the EU's common security and defence policy.

**Table 2: Opinion of French Citizens in Relation to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy**

	Supported	Not supported	Don't know
Eurobarometer 93 (Summer 20)	75%	17%	8%
Eurobarometer 92 (Autumn 19)	76%	13%	11%
Eurobarometer 91 (Spring 19)	74%	16%	10%
Eurobarometer 90 (Autumn 18)	77%	17%	6%
Eurobarometer 89 (Spring 18)	74%	17%	9%
Eurobarometer 88 (Autumn 17)	78%	17%	5%
Eurobarometer 87 (Spring 17)	78%	16%	6%
Eurobarometer 86 (Autumn 16)	80%	13%	7%
Eurobarometer 85 (Spring 16)	80%	13%	7%

Eurobarometer 84 (Autumn 15)	77%	15%	8%
Eurobarometer 83 (Spring 15)	77%	14%	9%
Eurobarometer 82 (Autumn 14)	78%	15%	7%
Eurobarometer 81 (Spring 14)	80%	13%	7%
Eurobarometer 80 (Autumn 13)	77%	14%	9%
Eurobarometer 79 (Spring 13)	78%	16%	6%

**Source:** Eurobarometer 79-93, 2013-2020

**Table 2.1: Opinion of French Citizens on the EU's Common Foreign Policy**

	Supported	Not supported	Don't know
Eurobarometer 93 (Summer 20)	59%	28%	13%
Eurobarometer 92 (Autumn 19)	61%	24%	15%
Eurobarometer 91 (Spring 19)	57%	28%	15%
Eurobarometer 90 (Autumn 18)	60%	30%	10%
Eurobarometer 89 (Spring 18)	56%	33%	11%
Eurobarometer 88 (Autumn 17)	57%	33%	10%
Eurobarometer 87 (Spring 17)	59%	33%	8%
Eurobarometer 86 (Autumn 16)	62%	31%	7%
Eurobarometer 85 (Spring 16)	60%	30%	10%
Eurobarometer 84 (Autumn 15)	55%	34%	11%
Eurobarometer 83 (Spring 15)	61%	28%	11%
Eurobarometer 82 (Autumn 14)	62%	28%	10%
Eurobarometer 81 (Spring 14)	62%	29%	9%
Eurobarometer 80 (Autumn 13)	61%	30%	9%
Eurobarometer 79 (Spring 13)	61%	30%	9%

**Source:** Eurobarometer 79-93,2013-2020

France took many concrete steps towards European security in the 2000s. In the ambassadors' speech on 26 August 2009, following France's return to the military wing of NATO, then French President Nicolas Sarkozy's statement that Europeans were the most powerful group within NATO was seen as emphasising the phenomenon of Europeanism. On 27 August 2018, Emmanuel Macron described 2017 as the best year in the last 60 years in terms of the development of European security (Ayhan, 2020: 523).

Also in the same year, Emmanuel Macron stated in his interview with the radio station Europe 1, which he joined on 6 November 2018, that Europeans will not be able to defend themselves if a real European army is not built; in the said statement, he declared that the USA, Russia and China are among the countries against which Europe will defend itself (Samuel, 2018).

### **3.3. Perspectives of Other Member States on CSDP and the European Army Concept**

The EU common security and defense policy has shown many concrete developments as a result of the discussions of the European and Atlanticist groups within the union, especially France and England, and the reaching of consensus on various issues, resulting in joint decisions. Over time, with Germany deciding to be effective not only in the economic field but also in foreign policy, these three countries began to direct the EU's common security and defense policy. The other EU member states have basically taken their place around the European and Atlanticist perspective. With England's withdrawal from the EU, the discussions on the common army began to increase; the member states that expressed their opinions in favor and against the issue have guided the course of the discussion.

#### **3.3.1. Member States with a Positive View on the CSDP and the European Army Concept**

After Germany and France, which support the development of a common EU security and defense policy and call for a common European army, Italy and Spain, which have the largest populations in the EU, also want to increase cooperation in the CSDP. In this context, concrete steps have been taken by Italy and Spain to support the CSDP. For example, the European Rapid Operational Force headquarters were established in Florence, Italy, and the European Gendarmerie Force headquarters were established in Florence, Italy (Çelik, 2017: 213-214).

Franco Frattini, one of the Italian Foreign Ministers of the period, warned the member states that if a common foreign policy could not be found by the EU member states, the EU could become ineffective; otherwise, the EU would be sidelined by the US and China. Frattini, who stated that the EU needed political will and commitment, said that if the necessary political will and commitment were not shown, EU citizens would be disappointed. Frattini also stated that having a European army was a necessary goal. (Owen, 2009) Paolo Gentiloni, one of the Italian Prime Ministers of the period, and Roberta Pinotti, one of the Italian Defense Ministers of the period, called for the establishment of a common permanent military force in which the member states would participate, in a program where the level of European defense cooperation of the EU countries they attended during their time as prime ministers and ministers was discussed (Barigazzi, 2016b).

Spain supports security and defense policies planned to be developed among EU member states. For example, Spain, together with Italy, has supported France and Germany in calling for the establishment of autonomous EU institutions that will assume responsibility for joint military operations in order to establish closer European defense cooperation. In this context, the Defense Ministers of Germany, France, Italy and Spain sent a letter to the defense ministers of other EU member states on October 11, 2016, stating that the defense capacity of the EU should be strengthened in order to prevent uncertainties in the security environment of Europe (Beesley, 2016). Spain also wants to play a greater role in EU security and defense policies. In particular, it wants to become a more effective and influential country



within the union by filling the military gap that will arise with the withdrawal of the UK from the EU after Brexit (Pirner, 2018).

Among the Benelux countries, Belgium and Luxembourg are among the countries with a pro-European attitude; they strive for military unity in European integration to be realized at a supranational level as much as possible. For example, Belgium and Luxembourg, together with Germany and France, supported the establishment of an EU headquarters independent of NATO in Tervuren, Belgium (Çelik, 2017: 213).

Belgium and Luxembourg, who have similar views on the defense of Europe, also view the establishment of a European army positively in addition to this support. For example, Luxembourg Defense Minister Etienne Schneider stated during his time as minister that Luxembourg would join a common European army, but that the establishment of such a military structure depended on a number of factors; he stated that Luxembourg would make the necessary contribution depending on the steps to be implemented for the establishment of the European army. Schneider also said that considering the current political situation, the establishment of a common army required a long-term perspective and caused certain difficulties; he stated that EU member states needed to reach a consensus on a number of politically complex issues (Luxembourg Times, 2015).

Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Cyprus (GCAC) are among the countries that support the EU's security and defense policies; they do not hesitate to act together with the EU on Europe's security and are among the countries that look favorably on the establishment of a joint force for the defense of the EU (Terlikowski, 2021). In addition, citizens of Greece and the Cypriot Administration see the goal of a European army as a more achievable goal compared to citizens of other member states. This is supported by the fact that Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration are the countries that responded with the highest rates of "probably yes" to the statement "The EU will have its own army within 50 years" in Eurobarometer 67 (Terlikowski, 2021).

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, which are among the Visegrad Group countries, support cooperation in the development of the CSDP and have a positive view on efforts to establish a European army. In this context, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban, one of the countries in question, proposed the establishment of an EU-wide force to secure its borders; he emphasized the importance of giving priority to security and argued that work should be started on the establishment of a common European army. His proposal was supported by the then Czech Prime Minister Bohuskav Sobotka; he stated that the project would not be easy but that EU member states could cooperate better on defense issues and border protection. (Deutsche Welle, 2021) Sobotka also stated that they could only defend their own interests with an EU-wide armed force and that such a force would not compete with NATO. He also said that the EU military force would be more reliable and effective compared to NATO (Dempsey, 2016).

In addition to Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto has also made statements supporting the European army. Szijjaro stated that the Hungarian government supports preparations for the establishment of a European army that can carry out peacekeeping missions in

neighboring regions. (Visegrad Post, 2017) During his time as prime minister, Slovakia's Prime Minister Robert Fico argued that Slovakia should be included in what he called the "EU core" led by Germany and France; although he considered the Visegrad Group cooperation important, he stated that a higher level of cooperation to be developed together with Germany and France was a higher priority for Slovakia (Ceklova, 2017)

Karl Erjavec, one of the Slovenian Defense Ministers, stated during his term as minister that some activities were more suitable for the EU, while others were better carried out through NATO, and emphasized that Europe needed capabilities that would enable it to respond to security challenges on its own. Thus, he stated the necessity of establishing a joint European force (The Slovenia Times, 2018).

### **3.4. Member States with Negative Views on the CSDP and the European Army Concept**

There are many states within the union that keep their distance from the EU's common security and defense policy and have negative views about the European army. These countries include Atlanticists and states that have adopted a policy of neutrality. Ireland, due to its traditional stance of preferring to be among neutral countries in security and defense matters, does not look favorably on efforts to establish a separate military structure within the EU. So much so that Ireland initially did not accept to be in a battle group under the auspices of the EU, which was first brought to the agenda in 2004; it later preferred to be included in this group (Çelik, 2017: 212). Similarly, it did not join PESCO in the first phase; it participated in this structure with Portugal in the second phase.

As can be seen from the examples given, Ireland does not unconditionally support EU policies on security and defense. Ireland primarily evaluates the current situation within itself; if it deems it appropriate, it joins the established structure. In other words, Ireland is not against cooperation in the defense of Europe. In fact, a survey conducted by the organization "European Movement Ireland" in 2021 showed that 54% of Irish citizens support Ireland being part of the increasing EU defense and security cooperation (European Movement Ireland, 2021). Support for the concept of a European army is considerably less than support for cooperation in European defense. Many political party representatives, in particular, have a negative view of efforts to establish a European army. This was confirmed by the "The Week in Politics" program broadcast on Raidio Teilifis Eireann, Ireland's public radio and television channel, on May 5, 2019. Irish politicians who participated in this program spoke out against a European army (The Journal, 2019).

Apart from Ireland, Austria also has a cautious approach to the EU common security and defense policy and the concept of a European army. Austria, which sees itself as a neutral country in security and defense policies, initially did not accept to be in a battle group under the auspices of the EU, similar to Ireland; later it preferred to be included in this group. Unlike many EU members, Austria, which prefers not to be a member of NATO, has an attitude against a European army. For example, Austrian Prime Minister Christian Kern stated in a statement during his time as prime minister that he could not imagine the Austrian army being under the control of a

non-Austrian commander. Sebastian Kurz stated during his time as foreign minister that any behavior contrary to Austria's neutral stance was unacceptable and therefore even discussing a European army would be a mistake. (Vytika, 2016) Similar to Kern and Kurz's statements, Austrian Defense Minister Hans Peter Doskozil opposed the establishment of a European army and Austria's inclusion in this structure in a statement during his time as defense minister; he drew attention to the fact that there were five neutral countries (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Malta) that could stand in the way of any joint decision by the EU (Vytika, 2017).

Another EU member state that has a negative approach to the concept of a European army is Finland. Jussi Niinistö, one of Finland's former defense ministers, criticized the efforts to establish a European army supported by France and Germany in a program he attended on the Finnish News Agency channel during his term as minister, and stated that this project was not compatible with Finland's security policy (Warsaw Institute, 2018). In addition to Finnish politicians, Finnish citizens also oppose the establishment of a common defense force for the EU. According to a survey conducted by "Maaseudun Tulevaisuus", a newspaper published in Finland, only 26% of Finnish citizens expressed support for the establishment of a common defense force for the EU, while 84% of Finnish politicians stated that they were against the idea of a European army (Yleisradio, 2019).

Similar to Finland, Sweden also has an attitude against a European army. This is supported by the statement made by Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist. In his statement, Hultqvist stated that a deep partnership with NATO and transatlantic ties are important for Swedish defense and security policy; he stated that he supports close cooperation between the EU and NATO; however, he emphasized that he does not see the need to create a European army or expand the EU military headquarters. (Trend News Agency, 2019) Sweden, which had good relations with the US despite not being a member of NATO at the time, argued that the EU's security and defense policies should be implemented within the framework of agreements with NATO; that different views could be expressed, including a European army, but ultimately the policies would be implemented based on the agreements made (Mehta, 2019).

Malta, which sees itself as a neutral country, has a similar attitude to other countries that prefer to remain neutral in their security and defense policies. Joseph Muscat, a former prime minister of Malta, stated that he was skeptical of the proposal for a European army during his time as prime minister and that Malta would not be a part of such a structure, but that they would not prevent EU countries that wanted to unite their armed forces into a single army (Diacono, 2017).

Poland has always supported defense policies that NATO is a part of. In this respect, Poland, which is not in the group of European countries, is suspicious of new formations outside of NATO due to the silence of Western European countries during the occupations it has experienced in the past; it has hesitations about trusting the guarantees that the EU will give regarding mutual defense. For these reasons, Poland opposes the idea of a European army. Indeed, the idea of a European army, which was put forward by the then President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker in 2015, was described as a very risky idea by the then Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Grzegorz Schetyna. Schetyna, who expressed his ideas on the Polish radio channel "Radio Zet", drew attention to the difficulties in

financing the joint army in question and training the units that will serve during the establishment of the European army. General Stanislaw Koziej, the security advisor of the then President Bronislaw Komorowski, described the idea of a European army as an impractical dream and stated that no country in Europe would consider giving up its sovereignty (Warsaw Institute, 2018).

The statements made by the Polish Foreign Minister of the time, Grzegorz Schetyna, regarding the concept of a European army also found a response in Latvia; the Prime Minister of Latvia at the time, Laimdota Straujuma, in her statement on the channel “Latvijas Televizija”, emphasized that the issue of a European army could be discussed at the next European Council meeting, but that the important thing was to make sure that NATO was not copied. Thus, Latvia emphasized the importance of NATO, as Poland also emphasized, but did not oppose the idea of a European army outright, as Poland did (Çelik, 2017).

Former Estonian Prime Minister Siim Kallas expressed his concerns about Juncker’s idea of a European army, drawing attention to the difficulty of establishing a structure equivalent to the currently functioning NATO and reaching a consensus on a common army. Kallas, who also served as Vice President of the European Commission after his term as Prime Minister, described the discussion on a European army as quite complicated; in support of his own ideas, he gave the example that it would be difficult to implement a joint decision if one member state wanted to join a war in Africa and another in Russia. Kallas openly stated that he doubted that all EU member states would fully participate in the war if the need to fight against Russia arose, and stated that instead of focusing on a European army, it would be a more appropriate step to strengthen border security and police forces (The Baltic Times, 2018). Another Baltic country, Lithuania, reacted to the concept of a European army in a similar way to other Baltic countries. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius harshly criticized the efforts to establish a joint army, fearing that it would cause distrust in the US; he stated that the talks on a European army had no basis because no one had any ideas on the subject, and that these discussions had created unfounded dissatisfaction and distrust on the other side of the Atlantic, resulting in unnecessary confusion. He also stated that he hoped that the US would remain an active player in global politics and that he saw NATO as a very successful and balanced alliance (The Baltic Times, 2019).

It can be said that Denmark’s approach to EU security and defense policy is a bit indecisive. Although Denmark supports the existence of a stronger EU security and defense policy, its defense policies as a country are based on a structure separated from EU defense cooperation. Although Denmark is in the EU, it does not feel like it fully belongs to the EU. The simplest indicator of this is that Danish voters did not approve the Maastricht Treaty, one of the most important agreements for the EU, and thus Denmark gained some privileges that would allow it to act independently from the EU, especially in security matters. Indeed, Denmark has preferred not to be in some formations that most EU members accept. For example, it has not joined PESCO. Among the reasons why Denmark does not participate in such new initiatives is the policy it follows to have an independent defense structure, as well as the belief that these initiatives could weaken NATO. In addition, Denmark is concerned that participating in more initiatives will increase costs and thus create

additional financial expenses. Denmark, which considers its relations with the USA to be among the most important elements of the country's security, therefore keeps its distance from new initiatives and does not look favorably on a European army that would be positioned as an alternative to NATO (Olesen, 2020: 27-30).

The Netherlands, which has different views than other Benelux countries regarding the EU's common security and defense policy, does not view the European army positively like Belgium and Luxembourg. So much so that Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte has claimed that Europe's security can only be guaranteed through NATO; he stated that France and Germany were too hasty in calling for a European army; and that a European army is too far for the Netherlands. (Radio Teilifis Eireann, 2018) Dutch Defense Minister Ank Bijleveld has also said that the concept of a European army is too far for the Netherlands; he also stated that the Netherlands is not alone, as there are other member states that oppose a common army. He also added that the Dutch army can work with NATO and the EU when necessary, but is not dependent on them (Asiran, 2018).

The concept of a European army was not received positively in Romania either; it was argued that NATO should continue to be a guarantor of European security. There were Romanian academics who included the subject of a European army in their studies; these studies criticized the concept of a common army. For example, Luciana Ghica, Director of the Center for International Cooperation and Development Studies at the University of Bucharest, likened the idea of a European army to opening a Pandora's box; she described it as an idea that shifted in a direction that many people would find inappropriate in the current economic and security environment (Flora et al., 2015).

Constantin Popov, Chairman of the Bulgarian Parliament's Defense Committee, said that the EU must build a common defense, but many challenges remain. Describing security as a common task and a common goal, Popov said that much work has been done in recent years to increase the EU's defense capacity, but there are still many unresolved issues that need to be addressed; he sees no particular reason to establish a common European army at this stage (Xinhua, 2019).

For Croatia, maintaining good relations with NATO is more important than establishing a European army. Indeed, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, one of the Croatian Presidents, stated during her presidency that the NATO military alliance constituted the cornerstone and backbone of Europe's security architecture; she stated that NATO was important for both Europe and Croatia in terms of security and stability (Aliyev, 2019).

When Portugal's approach to EU security and defense policies is examined, it is seen that it supports cooperation efforts within the EU. For example, Portugal took part in the establishment of the European Rapid Operational Force and the European Naval Force together with France, Italy and Spain. However, it opposes the establishment of a joint European army. Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo De Sousa stated that the Portuguese Parliament rejected the proposal that a European army should be established to strengthen European defense; and stated that the commitments undertaken with the transatlantic allies, the US and Canada, in Europe's defense and security cannot be abandoned (The Portugal Times, 2018).

## CONCLUSION

The EU's security and defence policy is essentially characterised by the polarisation of the Euro-Atlantic states. Taking into account the approaches of European countries, this study poses the question "Will the European Union be able to build a European army within the framework of the CSDP?". An attempt was made to answer the question within the framework of supranational and intergovernmental approaches. An attempt was made to solve the problem within the framework of supranational and intergovernmental approaches. Those in favour of the EU army (led by France and partly Germany) and those against the EU army (Atlanticists led by the United Kingdom) were examined.

Among these two groups, the European countries are positive about the innovations in the CSDP, while the Atlantic countries are cautious about the proposals for changes in security and defence issues. As far as the European army is concerned, the European countries are positive about this idea; the Atlantic countries reject the creation of an alternative structure to NATO in European defence.

France and Germany are the leading European countries for the development of CSDP, and the policies of these two countries on defence and security issues are strongly supported by Belgium and Luxembourg. In addition to these four countries, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Greece are in favour of the development of the CSDP; they are not a priori opposed to a possible common army, and even politicians in some countries of this group make statements supporting the European army.

Efforts to form a European army under the leadership of France, which still has influence in many parts of the world, particularly in Africa, due to its long-standing colonial policy, have been the subject of serious discussion, particularly in recent times. From the 2000s onwards, Germany realised that it did not just want to be an economic power within the EU and that it had the potential to be a politically influential country. German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that Europeans should take their destiny into their own hands emphasised the vision of one day building a true European army and expressed that this needed to be explored (Lough 2018); French President Emmanuel Macron's statement that NATO was brain-dead and that Europeans would not be able to defend themselves if a true European army was not built accelerated these discussions (Die Zeit, 2019).

Reactions to these discourses came both from the Atlantic countries within the EU and the states that have adopted the policy of neutrality, as well as from outside the Union, in particular the US and NATO. Countries in the EU that have a negative attitude towards the European army include the United Kingdom, which left the EU in 2020; Austria, Ireland, Malta, Finland and Sweden (both countries were not yet NATO members at the time), which prefer to remain neutral on defence and security issues; Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia express the need to build good relations with NATO, which they consider indispensable for Europe's security.

The United Kingdom, one of the countries with a negative attitude towards the European army, has clearly opposed the concept of a common army from the outset; it has always emphasised the continuity of good relations with NATO. Other

countries, including the UK, that reject the concept of a European army have in common that they see the existence of NATO as a guarantee for Europe and their own countries. The countries in this group consider it unrealistic to create an alternative structure to NATO. In fact, it is no coincidence that all of Russia's EU neighbours (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) do not support a structure to be created in place of NATO (Flora, 2015).

When the concept of the European army is discussed within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic countries, it becomes apparent that the EU countries are almost divided in two, and it goes without saying that there are many countries that take a positive and negative approach to the issue. In addition, the large number of member states with different views makes it difficult to reach an agreement on a common army. Similar to the European-Atlantic debate, the supranationalist-intergovernmentalist approach debate also contributes significantly to shaping the CSDP. During EU integration, it became apparent that the supranationalist approach was effective in areas such as economics, law and public affairs, but in security and defence issues, member states adopted an intergovernmental rather than a supranational approach. It can be observed that member states prioritise their national interests in foreign policy issues and avoid transferring their sovereign rights to a higher structure. In short, countries act with rational facts rather than idealistic thoughts when it comes to security and defence issues.

As set out in Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmental approach, in which rationality has an important place, European integration is, in the best terms, a series of rational decisions made by national leaders. (Moravcsik, 1998: 18) This statement also applies to CSDP. EU security and defence policy is based on the rational decisions of EU countries. No EU country wants to accept a proposal that does not correspond to its interests.

As a result of the study, the following conclusions were also drawn. Since the early years of the EU, there have been many developments in security and defence issues, many concrete steps have been taken, but there have been differences of opinion within the EU on the concept of the European army. The European countries led by France support the common army. The Atlantic countries, led by the United Kingdom, and other member states that want to maintain their neutral status in security policy have taken a stance against the concept of a European army. It is difficult to establish an alternative structure to NATO as there are member countries with opposing views. In addition to the Atlanticist-Europeanist distinction, the supranationalist-intergovernmentalist approach debate shows that the intergovernmental approach prevails in the areas of security and defence. As outlined in Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist approach, it becomes clear that rationality is paramount and that, given these arguments, it does not seem possible to build a European army in the near future.

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